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Introduction
Thomas Piketty’s work has placed the debate on distribution 
center stage both in mainstream neoclassical economics and 
in the public. Previously, the focus on distribution in the eco-
nomics profession was largely a unique selling point of some 
heterodox schools of thinking, most notably (post-) Keyne-
sianism and Marxism. Piketty has blazed a trail for research 
on distribution by showing that key premises of neoclassical 
economic theory regarding inequality do not hold up to em-
pirical scrutiny.1
Piketty has also pushed economic research further by expan-
ding the dominating focus of distribution analysis from in-
come to wealth. Important progress in stock-flow consistent 
modelling within the post-Keynesian school notwithstan-
ding, a focus on flows rather than stocks remains prevalent 
both in mainstream and in heterodox theoretical approaches. 
It is likely that the lack of reliable empirical data has played 
a key role in directing research towards income, and away 
from wealth.
1 His theoretical framework remains firmly rooted in neoclassical 
economics, and is thus open to criticism from heterodox econo-
mics (see for example Taylor 2014).
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The Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) is 
a new data set published by the European Central Bank that 
provides a basis for the analysis of wealth in 17 European 
countries for the first time. This has widened the scope for 
research on wealth in Europe significantly. In particular the 
detailed socioeconomic information available makes it pos-
sible to paint a richer picture of the wealth distribution than 
Piketty’s data allows him to do. 
From a progressive point of view, it is imperative that re-
search on inequality is not confined to income differentials 
based on the (functional and personal) income distributi-
on. The question of power, largely neglected in neoclassical 
mainstream economics, cannot be broached satisfactorily in 
economics without an understanding of the distribution of 
the command over resources, that is, in a first and simplify-
ing approximation, wealth. The ownership of wealth affects 
power relations and economic activity by conferring dis-
proportionate influence on the democratic process to a very 
small group of actors. The political sphere, in turn, has an 
impact on the design of the market framework within which 
economic actions occur, leading to a process of cumulative 
causation. Piketty shares this point of view; his scientific ana-
lysis is borne by the concern for democracy. 
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Wealth concentration in Europe
The HFCS data is categorized into household balance sheets. 
Assets include tangible assets, which comprise for instance 
the main residence, other real estate property, vehicles and 
shares in self-employment businesses, as well as financial 
assets, which contain deposits, shares, bonds and mutual 
funds, as well as money owed by others to the household. Li-
abilities consist of collateralized and non-collateralized debt. 
Due to the ex-ante harmonization of the HFCS survey it is 
possible to compare the available data across countries. How-
ever, looking at absolute wealth levels is not particularly me-
aningful. This is especially the case for median wealth, but 
also for the mean. The reason lies in the institutional differen-
ces of national welfare systems, which affect the necessity of 
private households to accumulate wealth (Fessler et al. 2012): 
Countries with a well-functioning social housing policy or 
pay-as-you-go public pension scheme tend to have lower 
private wealth. A more promising approach is thus the cross-
country comparison of distributional aspects, for which the 
data is very well suited.
Figure 1 lists the countries covered by the HFCS according 
to their Gini coefficient of net wealth. It shows that Austria, 
Germany, Cyprus and France have the highest inequality. At 
Gini values of up to 0.77, inequality in wealth is thus much 
higher than income inequality for all individual countries as 
well as for the Eurozone as a whole. The wealthiest 10 percent 
of households in the Eurozone own more than 50 percent of 
total net worth in the HFCS data. In contrast, regarding in-
come flows the 10 percent of households with the highest in-
come receive roughly 31 percent of total income (ECB 2013b).
The high concentration of wealth found in the HFCS is even 
likely to be an underestimation of the actual wealth inequa-
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Fig. 1. Gini index of wealth by country
lity. Both the willingness to participate in voluntary wealth 
surveys such as the HFCS at all (response rate), and to answer 
individual questions on wealth levels (item non-response) 
declines at the two tails of the wealth distribution. However, 
since the amount of wealth owned collectively at the lower 
end of the wealth distribution is negligibly small, the main 
cause of the distortion lies in the very high wealth levels at 
the top end of the distribution.2
This discrepancy between survey information and actual 
2 Some countries that participated in the HFCS attempted to cor-
rect for this underestimation through oversampling; however, 
this was not possible in all cases. The results suggest that coun-
tries that oversample achieve a partial correction of non-respon-
se bias and the low probability of very wealthy households to be 
drawn into the sample.
wealth is made palpable by a comparison between the HFCS 
data and the Forbes list of the richest people in each country 
(Vermeulen 2014). In Germany, the household with the high-
est wealth in the HFCS survey owns 76 million Euro, while 
the household with the lowest wealth out of the 52 Germans 
covered by the Forbes list has 818 million Euro. In Austria, the 
gap is even more dramatic. It spans from 22 million (HFCS) 
to 1,560 million Euro (Forbes).
For this reason, Piketty prefers administrative data on wealth, 
usually gathered through estate or wealth taxation. These 
capture the entire distribution of wealth much better, despi-
te problems relating to tax avoidance and evasion as well as 
exceptions in the legal definition of the tax base, which often 
differs from an economic or accounting-based definition of 
wealth.
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Piketty’s administrative sources also suggest underreporting 
of large fortunes in the HFCS. According to Piketty’s data, 
the top 1 percent in France owns roughly 24 percent of to-
tal wealth (Piketty 2014), whereas the HFCS data yields 18 
percent for that value. It is thus very likely that the inequa-
lity registered in the HFCS underestimates the actual level 
of wealth inequality. This should be borne in mind in the 
interpretation of results found from survey information on 
wealth, and the HFCS data in particular.
This distortion can be partially corrected for by exploiting the 
statistical regularity that top wealth levels are distributed ac-
cording to a Pareto distribution (Vermeulen 2014, Eckerstor-
fer et al. 2015). However, even these estimates may not fully 
capture the extent to which wealth inequality is understated 
by the HFCS data: Even at the upper limit of the range given 
by Vermeulen’s estimates, the share of France’s top 1 percent 
does not reach the 24 percent reported in Piketty’s adminis-
trative data.
On the whole, the findings from the first wave of the HFCS 
on wealth inequality clearly support Piketty’s conclusion: 
Wealth is extremely strongly concentrated in European high 
income countries. The HFCS data allows extending this fin-
ding to 15 further countries of the Eurozone.
Inheritances
One of Piketty’s main concerns is the role of inheritances in 
the rising concentration of wealth. He argues that at the be-
ginning of the 21st century, large fortunes are much more 
likely to arise from inheritance than from work. This is com-
parable to the situation in the 19th century, when substantial 
inheritances paved the way to a much higher living standard 
than labor income ever could.
Piketty’s conclusions regarding inheritances are based on 
data gathered painstakingly from French administrative ar-
chives on estate taxes and probate records established in the 
wake of the French revolution. Unfortunately, this also me-
ans that the results are not easily replicable for other Euro-
pean countries. Here, again, the HFCS can fill in the picture, 
albeit at the cost of underestimating inequality since survey 
information on past events such as inheritances is particular-
ly prone to underreporting.
The HFCS can be used to estimate the effect of different ex-
planatory factors on wealth inequality, as a first approach to 
disentangling the two possible sources of this inequality – sa-
vings out of income versus inheritances. Leitner (2015) ap-
plies the Shapley value approach to decomposition for selec-
ted HFCS countries. In this analysis, inheritances make up for 
roughly a third of the predicted inequality of gross wealth, 
which is by far the largest single factor, on average for all the 
countries covered (see Figure 3). In contrast, the contributi-
on from differences in gross household income amounts to 
about 10 percent. While there are some differences between 
countries in the individual factors, these should not be over-
stated. With the exception of education in Spain, Portugal 
and Luxembourg, inheritances are the single most important 
factor contributing to the inequality in gross wealth in all 
countries studied.
Thus, as Leitner (2015: 21) concludes, “[w]hether or not a 
person is born into a wealthy and educated family and thus 
inherits assets determines to a considerable extent whether 
he or she will make a fortune”. These findings from the HFCS 
thus confirm Piketty’s conclusions from his outstanding data 
on inheritances: Inheritances are crucial for wealth inequali-
ty in Europe. As Piketty stresses, this is linked to questions 
of equality of opportunity and thus the legitimization of the 
political and economic system. We turn to this question next.
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Wealth inequality and power 
relations
Wealth inequality has important implications for many facets 
of the economy and society, which is strongly linked to the 
question of power. However, this topic is typically neglected 
in mainstream economics. References to power are mostly 
restricted to monopoly power or bargaining power in goods 
and labor markets which are seen as deviations from perfect 
competition. 
By implication, this could lead to the view that the state of 
perfect competition is a situation free of power influence 
(Kalmbach 2008). In fact, general equilibrium theory obvia-
tes the consideration of power. A renowned contribution to 
show the irrelevance of power relations is Böhm-Bawerk’s 
(1914) paper “Power or Economic Law?”. The Austrian eco-
nomist questions the possibility of power relations that pre-
vent economic laws to determine prices and the allocation of 
goods in a long-term perspective. Böhm-Bawerk was of the 
opinion that the economic forces of marginal productivity 
will generally prevail (Berger and Nutzinger 2008). Although 
the perspective of Böhm-Bawerk’s contribution was not fo-
cused on power in general, power relations did not play a 
major role in mainstream economic theory after the so-called 
marginal revolution (Dürmeier 2008).
There are multitudinous explanations for this blind spot in 
mainstream economic theory. One reason is the contradiction 
between neoclassical methodological individualism versus 
the wider perspective of societal classes, which is required 
for analyzing power. This broader perspective, taken by 
classical economics, invariably entailed the consideration of 
political and economic conflicts and questions of power re-
lations. However, neoclassical economics focused on utility-
maximizing, summable individuals, with the effect that the 
microfoundations of macroeconomics deflate the relevance 
of unbalanced power relations or unequal power blocs in a 
society.
Another explanation of the absence of power in mainstream 
economic theory relates to the self-perception of neoclassical 
economics as an exact science with a physics-inspired me-
thodology (Mirowski 1989, Rothschild 2002). The empirical 
realist ontology of mainstream economics limits the conside-
ration of real-word economic issues such as power relations 
(Palermo 2007). The omission of power in economic theory 
is thus linked to the fear of loss of precision and the looming 
contamination of the pure science through less exact topics 
that are hard to quantify.
Power is a notoriously nebulous concept that is hard to pin 
down. While political and sociological approaches to power 
have been taken up and extended in heterodox economics, 
the focus is restricted to intentional behavior in the relations 
between more and less powerful individuals (relational pow-
er). However, in the application to wealth inequality, struc-
tural power is important. Dutt (2015) argues that the definiti-
on of power can be broadened in the optimization approach 
by considering purposive action to change the “rules of the 
game”. The concept of structural power entails the possibility 
to shape the framework in which political institutions, econo-
mic subjects, scientists, or the media operate. Structural pow-
er also comprises setting the public agenda and influencing 
the norms of discussion, that is, which topics are “open” to 
debate and which are off-limits. The aim of structural power 
is to maintain the prevailing power relations. 
We briefly discuss three aspects of how the unequal wealth 
distribution may affect power relations and economic activi-
ty. Since an exhaustive discussion of inequality and power is 
beyond the scope of this paper, we confine ourselves to, first, 
wealth inequality and the participation in political decision 
making processes, second, the concentration of the means of 
production and corporate power, and third, the discrepancy 
between private wealth and public debt as a source of power.
Regarding the first aspect, the connection between wealth 
inequality and political power, there is a distinct dearth of 
empirical work. This is likely to be due to the lack of wealth 
data on the one hand, and to the difficulty in quantifying po-
wer on the other hand. An important exception is Page et al. 
(2013) who gathered data on wealthy Americans in order to 
study the differences between their political preferences and 
those of the general public. They find a remarkable consisten-
cy between the preferences of the wealthy and actual policies. 
However, most work focuses only on income inequality. Gi-
lens and Page (2014: 564) show that income elites and orga-
nized groups representing business interests have substantial 
impact on policy making in the US, while “mass-based inte-
rest groups and average citizens have little or no independent 
influence”. Bonica et al. (2013) analyze the relation between 
US voter turnout and household income and reveal a distinct 
positive correlation. Duca and Saving (2014) document the 
existence of long-run, bi-directional feedback effects between 
income inequality and political polarization. 
Regarding the second aspect, the concentration of certain 
wealth components like business wealth also implies the 
concentration of corporate power. While concentration and 
centralization are systemic characteristics of capitalism, cor-
porate power can have a decisive impact on how society 
functions and is highly relevant for questions of political eco-
nomy. Harvey (2014) thus does not limit the consequences of 
corporate capital concentration and monopolistic tendencies 
to market pricing effects. He argues that the historical pro-
cess of commodification is the result of the rent-seeking mo-
tive and monopolistic preferences of capital owners (see also 
Crouch 2004). Commodification is an expression of changing 
power relations in a society since corporations enforce the 
private (and in the best case monopolistic) production of 
hitherto public goods. 
The third aspect briefly discussed here is the discrepancy 
between private and public wealth. While public wealth still 
played an important role in the post-World War II era, priva-
tizations and deregulation have been eroding it for decades. 
The mirror image of this decline is the ascension of private 
wealth since the 1970s (Piketty 2014). This development has 
been accelerated by the financial and economic crisis since 
2007. On the one hand, public means were used to restore 
private wealth through bailouts of corporations mainly in 
the financial sector in some European countries. On the other 
hand, budgets came under further pressure from automatic 
stabilizers reacting to the recession. While public debt rose 
dramatically as a consequence, public wealth was not expan-
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ded simultaneously. This alters the balance of power in fa-
vor of private corporations and wealthy individuals in the 
context of private-public partnerships and donation-funded 
public services. The preferences of democratically legitima-
ted institutions thus, at the very least, need to be aligned with 
those of the wealthy elite.
Conclusion
This paper argued that wealth inequality is a key topic for 
future research in heterodox economics, because it allows 
addressing the question of power. In our view, the cumulati-
ve causation processes between the command over resources 
and the ability to structurally shape the economic and social 
framework is of pivotal importance for a progressive under-
standing of economics.
Two recent developments give a new impetus to this area of 
research: Piketty’s success has sensitized both mainstream 
economics and the public to issues of distribution, and new 
data published by the European Central Bank, the Household 
Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS), makes it possible 
to paint a richer picture of the wealth distribution in the Eu-
rozone.
The cumulative causation processes inherent in wealth accu-
mulation run the risk of leading to an escalation of wealth 
inequality. On the one hand, as documented convincingly by 
Piketty, large fortunes reap higher returns, and are perpetua-
ted as dynastic wealth. On the other hand, very large fortunes 
may exert power by influencing the institutions governing 
economic and political decision making.
The question of power is inextricably interlinked with wealth 
inequality, and their interplay offers many interesting open 
questions for heterodox economics, both in theoretical and 
in empirical work. For instance, theoretical questions around 
the macroeconomic effects of wealth inequality beyond debt 
leverage and consumption out of wealth remain under-
addressed, as well as issues regarding the accumulation of 
wealth at different positions in the wealth and income dis-
tribution. Given the manifold open questions, the new data 
and the renewed interest in questions of distribution by the 
public and by parts of mainstream economics, we believe 
that there is an optimistic perspective for future inequality 
research in Europe. 
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